International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 34, Issue 3, pp 305–318 | Cite as

Definitions of equilibrium in network formation games

Original Article

Abstract

We examine a variety of stability and equilibrium definitions that have been used to study the formation of social networks among a group of players. In particular we compare variations on three types of definitions: those based on a pairwise stability notion, those based on the Nash equilibria of a link formation game, and those based on equilibria of a link formation game where transfers are possible.

Keywords

Networks Network games Game theory Equilibrium Side payments Transfers Bargaining 

JEL Classification Numbers

D85 C71 C72 L14 Z13 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.GREQAMUniversité d’Aix-MarseilleMarseilleFrance
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsStanford UniversityStanfordUSA

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