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International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 34, Issue 3, pp 425–442 | Cite as

A model of interim information sharing under incomplete information

  • Antonio Jiménez-Martínez
Original Article
  • 111 Downloads

Abstract

We propose a two-person game-theoretical model to study information sharing decisions at an interim stage when information is incomplete. The two agents have pieces of private information about the state of nature, and that information is improved by combining the pieces. Agents are both senders and receivers of information. There is an institutional arrangement that fixes a transfer of wealth from an agent who lies about her private information. In our model, we show that (1) there is a positive relation between information revelation and the amount of the transfers, and (2) information revelation has a collective action structure, in particular, the incentives of an agent to reveal decrease with respect to the amount of information disclosed by the other.

Keywords

Incomplete information Information revelation Costly signaling 

JEL Classification Numbers

C72 D82 D83 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Escuela de EconomíaUniversidad de GuanajuatoGuanajuatoMexico

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