International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 34, Issue 2, pp 155–165 | Cite as

The Value of Information Structures in Zero-sum Games with Lack of Information on One Side

Original Article

Abstract

Two players are engaged in a zero-sum game with lack of information on one side, in which player 1 (the informed player) receives some stochastic signal about the state of nature. I consider the value of the game as a function of player 1’s information structure, and study the properties of this function. It turns out that these properties reflect the fact that in zero sum situation the value of information for each player is positive.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Azrieli Y, Lehrer E (2005) The value of stochastic information structure. Games Econ Behav (Forthcoming)Google Scholar
  2. Blackwell D (1953) Equivalent comparisons of experiments. Ann Math Stat 24:265CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Gilboa I, Lehrer E (1991) The value of information—an axiomatic approach. J Math Econ 20:443CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Gossner O, Mertens JF (2001) The value of information in zero-sum games. (preprint)Google Scholar
  5. Le Cam L (1996) Comparison of experiments—a short review. In: Statistics, probability and game theory—papers in honor of David Blackwell Ferguson T, Shapley L (eds.), IMS Lecture Notes—Monograph Series 30Google Scholar
  6. Lehrer E, Rosenberg D (2004) What restrictions do Bayesian games impose on the value of information? J Math Econ (Forthcoming)Google Scholar
  7. Mertens JF, Zamir S (1985) Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplet information. Int J Game Theory 14:1CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Sorin S (2002) A first course on zero-sum repeated games. Springer, Berlin Heidelberg New YorkGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Mathematical SciencesTel Aviv UniversityTel AvivIsrael

Personalised recommendations