Median Stable Matching for College Admissions

Original Article

Abstract

We give a simple and concise proof that so-called generalized median stable matchings are well-defined for college admissions problems. Furthermore, we discuss the fairness properties of median stable matchings and conclude with two illustrative examples of college admissions markets, the lattices of stable matchings, and the corresponding generalized median stable matchings.

Keywords

Matching College admissions Stability Fairness 

JEL Classification

C78 D63 

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Copyright information

© Springer Verlag 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsMaastricht UniversityMaastrichtThe Netherlands
  2. 2.Institut d’Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)Bellaterra (Barcelona)Spain

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