International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 33, Issue 4, pp 479–490 | Cite as

An axiomatization of minimal curb sets

Abstract

Norde et al. [Games Econ. Behav. 12 (1996) 219] proved that none of the equilibrium concepts in the literature on equilibrium selection in finite strategic games satisfying existence is consistent. A transition to set-valued solution concepts overcomes the inconsistency problem: there is a multiplicity of consistent set-valued solution concepts that satisfy nonemptiness and recommend utility maximization in one-player games. The minimal curb sets of Basu and Weibull [Econ. Letters 36 (1991) 141] constitute one such solution concept; this solution concept is axiomatized in this article.

Key words

Minimal curb set Consistency 

JEL Classification

C72 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Econometrics and Operations ResearchTilburg UniversityThe Netherlands
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsStockholm School of EconomicsSweden

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