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Empirical Economics

, Volume 45, Issue 1, pp 567–582 | Cite as

Do time limits in the sickness insurance system increase return to work?

  • Pathric Hägglund
Article

Abstract

This article analyzes the effect of stricter enforcement of the eligibility criteria in the Swedish sickness insurance (SI) system. In 2008, time-restricted assessments of the individual’s working capacity on the 91st and 181st sick day was introduced. Taking advantage of the quasi-experimental feature of the intervention, I find a large and significant increased exit rate around the 181-day assessment. The impact is the result of longer spells outside SI-benefits, indicating that the stricter rules create disincentives to report sick.

Keywords

Public sickness insurance Policy evaluation Natural experiment 

JEL Classification

H55 I18 J22 J28 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.The Swedish Social Insurance Inspectorate and the Swedish Institute for Social ResearchStockholmSweden

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