Skip to main content

A secure voting scheme based on rational self-interest

Formal Aspects of Computing volume 24, pages 793–805 (2012)Cite this article

Abstract

We propose a scheme for secure voting that involves the candidates themselves in implementing the voting system. It exploits the competing interests (rivalry) and mutual distrust among the candidates to force an honest election.

This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution.

Access options

Buy single article

Instant access to the full article PDF.

USD 39.95

Price includes VAT (Canada)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

References

  1. [Cha04]

    Chaum D (2004) Secret-ballot receipts: true voter-verifiable elections. IEEE Secur Priv 2(1): 38–47

    Article  Google Scholar 

  2. [JJR02]

    Jakobsson M, Juels A, R L Rivest (2002) Making mix nets robust for electronic voting by randomized partial checking. In: In USENIX security symposium, pp 339–353

  3. [Knu97]

    Knuth DE (1997) Seminumerical algorithms, vol 2. In: The art of computer programming, 3rd edn. Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA

  4. [Lam78]

    Lamport L (1978) Time, clocks, and the ordering of events in a distributed system. Commun ACM 21(7): 558–565

    MATH  Article  Google Scholar 

  5. [LSP82]

    Lamport L, Shostak R, Pease M (1982) The Byzantine generals problem. TOPLAS 4(3): 382–401

    MATH  Article  Google Scholar 

  6. [RSA78]

    Rivest RL, Shamir A, Adelman L (1978) A method for obtaining digital signatures and public key cryptosystems. Commun ACM 21(2): 120–126

    MATH  Article  Google Scholar 

  7. [TC11]

    Taylor G, Cox G (2011) Digital randomness. IEEE Spectrum 48(9): 32–58

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, University of Texas at Austin, Mail Code: D9500, 1616 Guadalupe, Suite, 2.408, Austin, TX, 78701, USA

    Jayadev Misra

Authors
  1. Jayadev Misra
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Jayadev Misra.

Additional information

This work is partially supported by National Science Foundation grant CCF-0811536.

Peter Höfner, Robert van Glabbeek and Ian Hayes

Rights and permissions

Reprints and Permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Misra, J. A secure voting scheme based on rational self-interest. Form Asp Comp 24, 793–805 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00165-012-0248-1

Download citation

Keywords

  • Secure voting
  • Rational self-interest
  • Absence of coercion