Formal Aspects of Computing

, Volume 24, Issue 2, pp 249–266 | Cite as

Cut Set Analysis using Behavior Trees and model checking

  • Peter A. Lindsay
  • Nisansala Yatapanage
  • Kirsten Winter
Original Article

Abstract

Safety analysis can be labour intensive and error prone for system designers. Moreover, even a relatively minor change to a system’s design can necessitate a complete reworking of the system safety analysis. This paper proposes the use of Behavior Trees and model checking to automate Cut Set Analysis (CSA) : that is, the identification of combinations of component failures that can lead to hazardous system failures. We demonstrate an automated incremental approach to CSA, in which models are extended incrementally and previous results incorporated in such a way as to significantly reduce the time and effort required for the new analysis. The approach is demonstrated on a case study concerning the hydraulics systems for the Airbus A320 aircraft.

Keywords

Formal modelling Cut Set Analysis Automated failureanalysis Model checking Safety requirements FTA Behavior Trees 

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Copyright information

© British Computer Society 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Peter A. Lindsay
    • 1
  • Nisansala Yatapanage
    • 2
  • Kirsten Winter
    • 1
  1. 1.School of IT&EEThe University of QueenslandBrisbaneAustralia
  2. 2.Institute for Integrated and Intelligent SystemsGriffith UniversityNathanAustralia

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