Social security and conflict within the family
A husband and wife, though benefitting from marriage, may yet misappropriate some of the spouse's assets rather than let all be saved. In a Nash equilibrium, family savings may therefore be lower than what each spouse would prefer. Social Security, which is a form of forced, secure saving, can therefore increase welfare.
KeywordsSocial security Savings Bargaining
JEL ClassificationH55 D13 D91
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