Journal of Population Economics

, Volume 21, Issue 2, pp 331–338 | Cite as

Social security and conflict within the family



A husband and wife, though benefitting from marriage, may yet misappropriate some of the spouse's assets rather than let all be saved. In a Nash equilibrium, family savings may therefore be lower than what each spouse would prefer. Social Security, which is a form of forced, secure saving, can therefore increase welfare.


Social security Savings Bargaining 

JEL Classification

H55 D13 D91 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of California, IrvineIrvineUSA

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