Enactive–performative perspectives on cognition and the arts

  • Simon Penny
Original Article


The practices of the arts—plastic and performing—deal in direct sensorial engagement with the body, with materiality, with artifacts and tools, with spaces, and with other people. The arts are centrally concerned with intelligent doing. Conventional explanations of the cognitive dimensions of arts practices have been unsatisfying because internalist paradigms provides few useful tools to discuss embodied dimensions of cognition.


Embodied cognition Enactive cognition Distributed cognition Internalism Cartesian dualism Artificial intelligence 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag London Ltd., part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Studio ArtUniversity of CaliforniaIrvineUSA

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