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AI & SOCIETY

, Volume 32, Issue 4, pp 483–496 | Cite as

Arguments from authority and expert opinion in computational argumentation systems

  • Douglas WaltonEmail author
  • Marcin Koszowy
Original Article

Abstract

In this paper we show that an essential aspect of solving the problem of uncritical acceptance of expert opinions that is at the root of the ad verecundiam fallacy is the need to disentangle argument from expert opinion from another kind of appeal to authority. Formal and computational argumentation systems enable us to analyze the fault in which an error has occurred by virtue of a failure to meet one or more of the requirements of the argumentation scheme from argument from expert opinion. We present a method for enhancing this capability by showing how arguments from expert opinion are related to, but different from, arguments from deontic authority.

Keywords

Deontic authority Fallacious argument from authority (argumentum ad verecundiamArgument from expert opinion Defeasible argumentation 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag London 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Centre for Research in Reasoning, Argumentation and RhetoricUniversity of WindsorWindsorCanada
  2. 2.Department of Logic, Informatics and Philosophy of ScienceUniversity of BiałystokBiałystokPoland

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