AI & SOCIETY

, Volume 31, Issue 2, pp 171–190 | Cite as

Simulation, self-extinction, and philosophy in the service of human civilization

Original Article
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Abstract

Nick Bostrom’s recently patched “simulation argument” (Bostrom in Philos Q 53:243–255, 2003; Bostrom and Kulczycki in Analysis 71:54–61, 2011) purports to demonstrate the probability that we “live” now in an “ancestor simulation”—that is as a simulation of a period prior to that in which a civilization more advanced than our own—“post-human”—becomes able to simulate such a state of affairs as ours. As such simulations under consideration resemble “brains in vats” (BIVs) and may appear open to similar objections, the paper begins by reviewing objections to BIV-type proposals, specifically those due a presumed mad envatter. In counter example, we explore the motivating rationale behind current work in the development of psychologically realistic social simulations. Further concerns about rendering human cognition in a computational medium are confronted through review of current dynamic systems models of cognitive agency. In these models, aspects of the human condition are reproduced that may in other forms be considered incomputable, i.e., political voice, predictive planning, and consciousness. The paper then argues that simulations afford a unique potential to secure a post-human future, and may be necessary for a pre-post-human civilization like our own to achieve and to maintain a post-human situation. Long-standing philosophical interest in tools of this nature for Aristotle’s “statesman” and more recently for E.O. Wilson in the 1990s is observed. Self-extinction-level threats from State and individual levels of organization are compared, and a likely dependence on large-scale psychologically realistic simulations to get past self-extinction-level threats is projected. In the end, Bostrom’s basic argument for the conviction that we exist now in a simulation is reaffirmed.

Keywords

Simulation Model Cognitive social science Democracy Brain in a vat Skepticism Global coordination problem 
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Notes

Acknowledgments

Special thanks to Peter Broedner for the patience to advise multiple drafts of this paper. He is largely responsible for its depth of analysis. Thanks also go to the Fall 2014 Ethics class at KAIST for testing some of the arguments entertained herein, especially those regarding the statesman and leadership. This work would not be possible without the consistent support of Ron Sun and Jun Tani. Thanks also to Luis Pereira and the anonymous reviewers of this journal for constructive comments on earlier drafts. Finally, this paper began as a conference talk the travel to which was funded in part by MBR 2012, and sets out a collective limit on self-abduction as currently under development for a monograph for SAPERE, so would not have been finished in this form without opportunities afforded by Lorenzo Magnani. Grazie mille.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag London 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Humanities and Social SciencesKorean Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST)DaejeonSouth Korea

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