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Blockcipher-Based Authenticated Encryption: How Small Can We Go?

  • Avik ChakrabortiEmail author
  • Tetsu Iwata
  • Kazuhiko Minematsu
  • Mridul Nandi
Article

Abstract

This paper presents a lightweight blockcipher-based authenticated encryption mode mainly focusing on minimizing the implementation size, i.e., hardware gates or working memory on software. The mode is called \(\textsf {COFB}\), for COmbined FeedBack. \(\textsf {COFB}\) uses an n-bit blockcipher as the underlying primitive and relies on the use of a nonce for security. In addition to the state required for executing the underlying blockcipher, \(\textsf {COFB}\) needs only n / 2 bits state as a mask. Till date, for all existing constructions in which masks have been applied, at least n bit masks have been used. Thus, we have shown the possibility of reducing the size of a mask without degrading the security level much. Moreover, it requires one blockcipher call to process one input block. We show \(\textsf {COFB}\) is provably secure up to \(O(2^{n/2}/n)\) queries which is almost up to the standard birthday bound. We first present an idealized mode \(\textsf {iCOFB}\) along with the details of its provable security analysis. Next, we extend the construction to the practical mode COFB. We instantiate COFB with two 128-bit blockciphers, AES-128 and GIFT-128, and present their implementation results on FPGAs. We present two implementations, with and without CAESAR hardware API. When instantiated with AES-128 and implemented without CAESAR hardware API, COFB achieves only a few more than 1000 Look-Up-Tables (LUTs) while maintaining almost the same level of provable security as standard AES-based AE, such as GCM. When instantiated with GIFT-128, COFB performs much better in hardware area. It consumes less than 1000 LUTs while maintaining the same security level. However, when implemented with CAESAR hardware API, there are significant overheads both in hardware area and in throughput. COFB with AES-128 achieves about 1475 LUTs. COFB with GIFT-128 achieves a few more than 1000 LUTs. Though there are overheads, still both these figures show competitive implementation results compared to other authenticated encryption constructions.

Keywords

COFB AES GIFT Authenticated encryption Blockcipher 

Notes

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Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Avik Chakraborti
    • 1
    Email author
  • Tetsu Iwata
    • 2
  • Kazuhiko Minematsu
    • 3
  • Mridul Nandi
    • 4
  1. 1.NTT Secure Platform LaboratoriesTokyoJapan
  2. 2.Nagoya UniversityNagoyaJapan
  3. 3.NEC CorporationTokyoJapan
  4. 4.Applied Statistics UnitIndian Statistical InstituteKolkataIndia

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