Journal of Cryptology

, Volume 29, Issue 4, pp 879–926 | Cite as

Toward a Game Theoretic View of Secure Computation

  • Gilad Asharov
  • Ran Canetti
  • Carmit HazayEmail author


We demonstrate how Game Theoretic concepts and formalism can be used to capture cryptographic notions of security. In the restricted but indicative case of two-party protocols in the face of malicious fail-stop faults, we first show how the traditional notions of secrecy and correctness of protocols can be captured as properties of Nash equilibria in games for rational players. Next, we concentrate on fairness. Here we demonstrate a Game Theoretic notion and two different cryptographic notions that turn out to all be equivalent. In addition, we provide a simulation-based notion that implies the previous three. All four notions are weaker than existing cryptographic notions of fairness. In particular, we show that they can be met in some natural setting where existing notions of fairness are provably impossible to achieve.


Secure computation Fairness Game theory 


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Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Computer Science and EngineeringHebrew University of JerusalemJerusalemIsrael
  2. 2.School of Computer ScienceTel Aviv UniversityTel AvivIsrael
  3. 3.Department of Computer ScienceBoston UniversityBostonUSA
  4. 4.Faculty of EngineeringBar-Ilan UniversityRamat GanIsrael

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