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Journal of Cryptology

, Volume 21, Issue 3, pp 303–349 | Cite as

Handling Expected Polynomial-Time Strategies in Simulation-Based Security Proofs

  • Jonathan Katz
  • Yehuda LindellEmail author
Article

Abstract

The standard class of adversaries considered in cryptography is that of strict polynomial-time probabilistic machines. However, expected polynomial-time machines are often also considered. For example, there are many zero-knowledge protocols for which the only known simulation techniques run in expected (and not strict) polynomial time. In addition, it has been shown that expected polynomial-time simulation is essential for achieving constant-round black-box zero-knowledge protocols. This reliance on expected polynomial-time simulation introduces a number of conceptual and technical difficulties. In this paper, we develop techniques for dealing with expected polynomial-time adversaries in simulation-based security proofs.

Keywords

Expected polynomial-time Black-box simulation Secure multiparty computation Zero-knowledge 

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Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of MarylandCollege ParkUSA
  2. 2.Department of Computer ScienceBar-Ilan UniversityRamat GanIsrael

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