Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 17, Issue 1, pp 85–93 | Cite as

Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized

  • John Duggan
  • Thomas Schwartz


The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem on the manipulability of social-choice rules assumes resoluteness: there are no ties, no multi-member choice sets. Generalizations based on a familiar lottery idea allow ties but assume perfectly shared probabilistic beliefs about their resolution. We prove a more straightforward generalization that assumes almost no limit on ties or beliefs about them.


Straightforward Generalization Shared Belief Probabilistic Belief Strategic Manipulability 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • John Duggan
    • 1
  • Thomas Schwartz
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Political Science and Department of Economics, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627, USA (e-mail:
  2. 2.Department of Political Science, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA 90024, USAUS

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