Economic Theory

, Volume 17, Issue 1, pp 141–162

Evolutionary dynamics on infinite strategy spaces

  • Jörg Oechssler
  • Frank Riedel
Research Articles

DOI: 10.1007/PL00004092

Cite this article as:
Oechssler, J. & Riedel, F. Econ Theory (2001) 17: 141. doi:10.1007/PL00004092

Summary. The study of evolutionary dynamics was so far mainly restricted to finite strategy spaces. In this paper we show that this unsatisfying restriction is unnecessary. We specify a simple condition under which the continuous time replicator dynamics are well defined for the case of infinite strategy spaces. Furthermore, we provide new conditions for the stability of rest points and show that even strict equilibria may be unstable. Finally, we apply this general theory to a number of applications like the Nash demand game, the War of Attrition, linear-quadratic games, the harvest preemption game, and games with mixed strategies.

Keywords and Phrases:Replicator dynamics, Evolutionary stability, Continuous strategy spaces. 
JEL Classification Numbers:C70, C72. 

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jörg Oechssler
    • 1
  • Frank Riedel
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24, 53113 Bonn, GERMANY (e-mail: DE
  2. 2.Department of Economics, Humboldt University, Spandauer Straße 1, 10178 Berlin, GERMANY (e-mail: DE

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