Organizational Impact of Blockchain through Decentralized Autonomous Organizations

  • Soichiro TakagiEmail author


There is a growing attention to “Blockchain” as a key technological innovation likely to change a wide spectrum of the economy and organizations. Blockchain, also referred to as “Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT)”, was initially created as a platform technology to enable Bitcoin. Bitcoin and similar digital currencies are issued and maintained by anonymous participants (peers) around the world. Although blockchain was developed to enable Bitcoin, there is a perception that it can be used not only for currencies but also for a wide range of assets, from digital content to real property. In addition, the development of the technology has enabled blockchain to work as a computing platform which conveys software codes in a decentralized network, eventually working as a “networked” or “decentralized” computer. The current prior studies are concentrated on the impact and challenges of Bitcoin or similar digital currencies, but the studies on the impact of the fundamental blockchain technology are limited. On the other hand, blockchain has a possibility to affect wide aspects of the economy, such as intermediary services, digital currency, organizational structures, data management, microtransactions, and newly created industry. Among them, this paper focuses on how blockchain may affect organizational structures and quantitatively analyses which occupations are most suitable for Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO). The quantitative analysis with O*NET data reveals that three main clusters of occupations are the most suitable for DAO: “IT experts”, “Brokerage tasks”, and “Information handling occupations”.

Key words

Blockchain Bitcoin Decentralized Autonomous Organizations 

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JEL Classification Code



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This study is presented at The 15th International Conference of the Japan Economic Policy Association. The author thanks to the participants and discussant at the conference, and also anonymous referees for helpful comments. This work was partially supported by JSPS KAKENHI, Grant Number 15K00460. All errors remain the author’s.


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© Japan Economic Policy Association (JEPA) 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Center for Global CommunicationsInternational University of JapanTokyoJapan

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