Proliferation of Anti-Dumping Initiations Against China, its Economic Growth and Subsidized Industries

  • Kalibinuer KeyimuEmail author


This paper discusses and analyzes the proliferation of AD measures against China as protection against its exports in relation to its rapid economic development. In order to clarify and emphasize the rapid growth of China’s economy and its influence on the world economy, the paper first divides the global economy into two components; world without China and China itself by using a weighted-sum analysis approach. Then based on these two components, the proliferation of AD measures is analyzed along with the economic growth and downturns respectively. Chinese GDP growth rate has been rising rapidly despite growing AD measures against its exports, and their correlation is positive, whereas the world without China case shows a negative correlation. Based on this point, the paper focuses on the special case of China in combination with China’s government subsidy policy as its research objective. China’s top ten industries, which are chosen on the basis of frequency of AD measures against them, are examined based on their domestic output and exports. The hypothesis of a strong correlation between domestically subsidized industries and the top ten industries that faced AD measures is examined. An approach, that involves sophisticated examination of products, industries, firms and regions faced with AD measures, and government subsidies they received, will be adopted respectively.

Key words

Economic growth Anti-dumping measures Protectionism 

JEL Classification



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Copyright information

© Japan Economic Policy Association (JEPA) 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Graduate School of EconomicsNagoya University Furo-choNagoyaJapan

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