Operational Research

, Volume 2, Issue 2, pp 209–241 | Cite as

Applications of game theory in finance and managerial accounting

Article

Abstract

Game theory has been applied during the last two decades to an ever increasing number of important practical problems in economics, industrial organization, business strategy, finance, accounting, market design and marketing; including antitrust analyses, monetary policy, and firm restructuring. In this paper we give insight into the growing role of game theory, and particularly of the principal-agent model, for the important fields of finance and managerial accounting.

Keywords

Equilibria Game Theory Mathematical Programming Portfolio Selection Corporate Finance Managerial Accounting 

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Copyright information

© Hellenic Operational Research Society 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Dept. of Production Engineering and Management Decision Support Systems LaboratoryTechnical University of CreteChaniaGreece

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