Intereconomics

, Volume 34, Issue 6, pp 297–302 | Cite as

Efficiencies in merger analysis

  • Konstanze Kinne
Competition Policy
  • 125 Downloads

Abstract

In recent years the world has been a wave of mergers that is unprecedented as regards both the number and the size of the enterprises involved. The firms concerned have frequently complained that the government agencies in charge of merger control do not sufficiently take account of the welfare-enhancing efficiencies created in the process. This article analyses the differences in merger control practice and the underlying theories in Germany, the European Union and the USA.

Keywords

Market Power Competition Policy Horizontal Merger Merger Control Merger Analysis 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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Copyright information

© HWWA and Springer-Verlag 1999

Authors and Affiliations

  • Konstanze Kinne
    • 1
  1. 1.Hamburg Institute for Economic Research (HWWA)Germany

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