Ownership structure and returns to defensive stock repurchase

  • Criss G. Woodruff
  • Khalil M. Torabzadeh
  • James B. Ross


This study investigates the wealth effect of defensive common stock repurchase (CSR) on outside shareholders. It is found that the impact varies with the type of corporate control activity that precipitates the repurchase. Outside shareholders suffer wealth losses when a CSR announcement follows an unsolicited bid for the firm. The impact of the CSR announcement following a partial acquisition is negative but not as strong. However, outside shareholders benefit from CSR following antitakeover charter amendments. This study also documents a nonlinear relationship between managerial equity ownership and changes in the value of the firm at the announcement of a defensive CSR.


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Copyright information

© Springer 1995

Authors and Affiliations

  • Criss G. Woodruff
    • 1
  • Khalil M. Torabzadeh
    • 2
  • James B. Ross
    • 2
  1. 1.Texas A&M UniversityCorpus Christi
  2. 2.Radford UniversityRadford

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