On not being rational
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A Bayesian decision-theoretic approach appears to me as a sensible idealization of a guide to behaviour. At the same time I would like to understand why my behaviour is not always of this form: I sometimes use randomization and I sometimes find confidence intervals acceptable. Not all of my problems have an explicit cost function. Am I lazy or irrational? Do I use non-Bayesian conventions to help communicate? Is the cost of rationality-computation missing from the Bayesian model?
KeywordsDecision Theory Utility Computation Cost Randomization Imputations Concept Formation Nonparametric Statistics Confidence Intervals Maximum Likelihood Vagueness Conjugate Priors Statistical Package
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