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On not being rational

  • I. R. Savage
Personal and Inter-Personal Ethics Invited Papers
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Summary

A Bayesian decision-theoretic approach appears to me as a sensible idealization of a guide to behaviour. At the same time I would like to understand why my behaviour is not always of this form: I sometimes use randomization and I sometimes find confidence intervals acceptable. Not all of my problems have an explicit cost function. Am I lazy or irrational? Do I use non-Bayesian conventions to help communicate? Is the cost of rationality-computation missing from the Bayesian model?

Keywords

Decision Theory Utility Computation Cost Randomization Imputations Concept Formation Nonparametric Statistics Confidence Intervals Maximum Likelihood Vagueness Conjugate Priors Statistical Package 

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Copyright information

© Springer 1980

Authors and Affiliations

  • I. R. Savage
    • 1
  1. 1.Yale UniversityNew HavenUSA

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