, Volume 45, Issue 2, pp 131–138 | Cite as

On the alleged connection between moral evil and human freedom: A response to Trakakis’ second critique

  • Joel Thomas TiernoEmail author


In this essay, I answer Nick Trakakis’ second critique of my argument against the adequacy of traditional free will theodicy. I argue, first, that Trakakis errs in his implicit assertion that my argument relies upon our being strongly malevolent by nature. I argue, second, that Trakakis errs in thinking that our being weakly benevolent, morally bivalent, or weakly malevolent by nature is sufficient to refute my critique of the traditional freewill theodicy. I still maintain that the argument from freedom of the will offers an explanation of moral evil that is, in the final analysis, manifestly inadequate.


Natural Disposition Adequate Explanation Human Freedom Moral Evil Receive Nature 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Copyright information

© Springer SBM B.V. 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Dept. of PhilosophyCommunity College of Southern NevadaUSA

Personalised recommendations