Journal of Economics and Finance

, Volume 24, Issue 1, pp 56–63 | Cite as

Revenue equivalence and income taxation

Article

Abstract

This paper considers the classical independent private values model of auction theory in the presence of income taxation. We show that revenue equivalence remains valid if income taxes are proportional. Progressive and regressive taxes lead, in general, to asymmetries between bidders with the well-known consequence that revenue equivalence no longer holds. However, if symmetry of the bidders is maintained, progressive (regressive) income tax implies a higher (lower) expected revenue in first-price than in second-price auctions.

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Copyright information

© Springer 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsHumboldt University at BerlinBerlinGermany
  2. 2.Department of Public EconomicsChristian Albrechts UniversityKielGermany

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