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Economic design

, Volume 1, Issue 1, pp 159–171 | Cite as

Robust implementation under alternative information structures

  • Luis C. Corchon
  • Ignacio Ortuño-Ortin
Article

Abstract

In this paper we consider a model in which agents have complete information about their neighbors and, possibly, incomplete information about the rest of the environment. We consider two different informational frameworks. In the first, agents do not have priors about the relevant characteristics in the rest of the environment. In the second, agents are supposed to have priors about the unknown characteristics. We present a mechanism which implements any social choice correspondence satisfying monotonicity and no veto power in both informational settings for every possible prior thus requiring little knowledge from the point of view of the designer of the information possessed by agents about the environment.

Keywords

Nash Implementation Incomplete information Local information 

JEL classification

CF2 DF1 D82 

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Copyright information

© Elsevier Science B.V 1994

Authors and Affiliations

  • Luis C. Corchon
    • 1
    • 2
  • Ignacio Ortuño-Ortin
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas and Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis EconómicoUniversidad de AlicanteAlicanteSpain
  2. 2.Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis EconómicoUniversidad de AlicanteAlicanteSpain

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