Journal of Labor Research

, Volume 17, Issue 4, pp 735–745 | Cite as

Risk and final offer arbitration usage rates: Evidence from major league baseball

  • Daniel R. Marburger
  • John F. Scoggins
Articles

Abstract

We use major league baseball data to examine risk and final-offer arbitration usage. Risk attitudes are proxied by the likelihood that FOA-generated salary increases place the player’s baseball employment at risk. Employment risk is inversely related to player quality. Our evidence suggests that higher-quality (low-risk) players are more likely to file for arbitration and seek an arbitrated settlement than lowerquality (high-risk) players.

Keywords

Certainty Equivalent Labor Relation Review Major League Baseball Final Offer Input Substitution 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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Copyright information

© Journal of Labor Research 1996

Authors and Affiliations

  • Daniel R. Marburger
    • 1
  • John F. Scoggins
    • 2
  1. 1.Arkansas State UniversityState University
  2. 2.University of FloridaGainesville

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