Journal of Labor Research

, Volume 3, Issue 1, pp 31–37 | Cite as

Formalization, collectivization, and the demand for union services

  • Farrell E. Bloch
Article

Abstract

Formalized collective bargaining rather than individual employer-employee negotiation is the fundamental characteristic of a unionized labor market. Formalization involves the substitution of rules for employer discretion. Collectivization substitutes simultaneous decision making on behalf of all workers in a unit for a set of individual employee decisions. Formalization and collectivization are present in nonunion as well as union labor markets and their extent varies within as well as between these two sectors. In particular, individuals may negotiate where they belong in a union environment, and the presence of rules invites negotiation over their interpretation. Nevertheless, because formalization and collectivization are obvious concomitants of trade union organization, their costs to both employers and employees should explain the probability of union organization, as well as the incidence of such antecedents of the modern trade union as the Italian padrone who acted as foreman, pay-master, and employment agency for newly-arrived immigrants to the United States; and the Indianjamdar, a construction industry recruiter-foreman.

Our occasional observations of union-induced costreductions may appear to counter the implicit assumption in much of the trade union literature that unions always induce suboptimal combinations of factor inputs and factor payments (nonunion firms could choose union-induced parameters on their own and do not). Because these cost reductions may be accompanied by increased costs imposed by unions, however, the cost reductions discussed below imply nothing about overall effects of unions on employers or employees.

Keywords

Trade Union Collective Bargaining Marginal Product Union Membership Human Capital Investment 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Journal of Labor Research 1982

Authors and Affiliations

  • Farrell E. Bloch
    • 1
  1. 1.Econometric Research, Inc.Washington, D.C.

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