Journal of Labor Research

, Volume 5, Issue 3, pp 215–228 | Cite as

Employer preferences for long-term union contracts

  • Sanford M. Jacoby
  • Daniel J. B. Mitchell


In recent years, the American industrial relations system has undergone considerable stress. One byproduct of a stressful period is that old ways of conducting industrial relations are being increasingly questioned. The fact that questions are raised, however, does not necessarily mean that the climate for change is receptive to all suggestions. In this paper we provide evidence that the management community would strongly oppose recent suggestions for the abandonment of long-term collective bargaining contracts.


Collective Bargaining Industrial Relation Union Wage Phillips Curve Union Sector 
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Copyright information

© Journal of Labor Research 1983

Authors and Affiliations

  • Sanford M. Jacoby
    • 1
  • Daniel J. B. Mitchell
    • 1
  1. 1.University of CaliforniaLos Angeles

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