The τ-value is a solution concept for a subclass of games with transferable utility introduced and axiomatized by Tijs (1981, 1987). In this note an alternative characterization of the τ-value by means of five axioms is offered. Two of them are well-known: efficiency and translation equivalence; the other three relate the solution of a game with the minimal and maximal aspiration vectors involved in the definition of the τ-value.
KeywordsTU games compromise value τ-value axiomatization
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