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Bulletin of Mathematical Biology

, Volume 59, Issue 5, pp 931–952 | Cite as

Multi-player matrix games

  • M. Broom
  • C. Cannings
  • G. T. Vickers
Article

Abstract

Game theory has had remarkable success as a framework for the discussion of animal behaviour and evolution. It suggested new interpretations and prompted new observational studies. Most of this work has been done with 2-player games. That is the individuals of a population compete in pairwise interactions. While this is often the case in nature, it is not exclusively so. Here we introduce a class of models for situations in which more than two (possibly very many) individuals compete simultaneously. It is shown that the solutions (i.e. the behaviour which may be expected to be observable for long periods) are more complex than for 2-player games. The concluding section lists some of the new phenomena which can occur.

Keywords

Payoff Game Theory Broom Pure Strategy Stable Strategy 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Society for Mathematical Biology 1997

Authors and Affiliations

  • M. Broom
    • 1
  • C. Cannings
    • 2
  • G. T. Vickers
    • 2
  1. 1.School of Mathematical SciencesThe Universityof SussexBrightonUK
  2. 2.School of Mathematics and StatisticsThe University of SheffieldSheffieldUK

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