Game theory has had remarkable success as a framework for the discussion of animal behaviour and evolution. It suggested new interpretations and prompted new observational studies. Most of this work has been done with 2-player games. That is the individuals of a population compete in pairwise interactions. While this is often the case in nature, it is not exclusively so. Here we introduce a class of models for situations in which more than two (possibly very many) individuals compete simultaneously. It is shown that the solutions (i.e. the behaviour which may be expected to be observable for long periods) are more complex than for 2-player games. The concluding section lists some of the new phenomena which can occur.
KeywordsPayoff Game Theory Broom Pure Strategy Stable Strategy
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