Philosophia

, Volume 27, Issue 1–2, pp 241–245 | Cite as

Supervenience and moral realsim

  • Luc Bovens
  • Dalia Drai
Discussion

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References

  1. Blackburn, S. (1973) «Moral Realism’. In: J. Casey (ed.)Morality and Moral Reasoning, Methuen, London, pp. 101–124.Google Scholar
  2. Blackburn, S. (1985) ‘Supervenience Revisited’. In: I. Hacking (ed.)Exercises in Analysis: Essays by Students of Casimir Lewy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Reprinted in: BLACKBURN, S. (1993)Essays in Quasi-Realism Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 130–145.Google Scholar
  3. Blackburn, S. (1993) “Addendum to ‘Supervenience Revisited’. In: BLACKBURN, S.Essays in Quasi-Realism, pp. 145–148.Google Scholar
  4. Horgan, T. and Timmons, M. (1990–1991) ‘New Wave Moral Realism Meets Moral Twin Earth’,Journal of Philosophical Research, 16, pp. 447–465Google Scholar
  5. Horgan, T and Timmons, M. (1992) ‘Troubles on Moral Twin Earth: Moral Queerness Revived’,Synthese, 92, pp. 221–260.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Klagge, J.C. (1984) ‘An Alleged Difficulty Concerning Moral Properties’,Mind, 93, pp. 370–380.Google Scholar
  7. Kripke, S. (1972) ‘Naming and Necessity’. In: D. Davidson and G. Harman (eds.),Semantics of the Natural Language, Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 253–355.Google Scholar
  8. McFetridge, I.G. (1985) ‘Supervenience, Realism, Necessity’, The PhilosophicalQuarterly, 35, pp. 245–258Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Philosophia 1999

Authors and Affiliations

  • Luc Bovens
    • 1
    • 2
  • Dalia Drai
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.University of ColoradoBoulderUSA
  2. 2.Ben-Gurion UniversityBeer-ShevaIsrael

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