Public Choice

, Volume 62, Issue 3, pp 287–293 | Cite as

Monopoly deregulation in the presence of Tullock activities

  • Raul V. Fabella
Article

Abstract

We give the condition for a welfare improving monopoly deregulation when the decision making process cannot be insulated from Tullock activities and players are risk neutral.

Keywords

Public Finance 
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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989

Authors and Affiliations

  • Raul V. Fabella
    • 1
  1. 1.School of EconomicsUniversity of the Philippines, DilimanQuezon CityPhilippines

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