Journal for General Philosophy of Science

, Volume 27, Issue 1, pp 71–90 | Cite as

Was Macht Eine Erkenntnistheorie Naturalistisch?

  • Dirk Koppelberg
Articles

On what makes an epistemology naturalistic

Summary

Since the publication of W. V. Quine's classic paper “Epistemology Naturalized” there have been many discussion on the virtues and vices of naturalistic epistemology. Within these discussions not much attention has been paid to a basic question: What makes an epistemology naturalistic? I give an answer by providing a logical geography of competing naturalistic positions. Then I defend naturalistic epistemology against the charge of the so-called causal fallacy. Finally I give a critical appraisal of different naturalistic theories of knowledge and introduce cooperative naturalism as the most promising research strategy.

Key words

naturalism naturalistic epistemology analytical epistemology theory of knowledge theory of epistemic justification causal fallacy 

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1996

Authors and Affiliations

  • Dirk Koppelberg
    • 1
  1. 1.Institut für PhilosophieFreie Universität BerlinBerlinGermany

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