Monetary policy in interdependent economies: A game theoretic approach Matthew B. Canzoneri and Dale W. Henderson MIT Press, 1991, 133 pp.
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This article reviews the recent book by Matthew Canzoneri and Dale Henderson on international monetary policy. The review discusses the basic model used by the authors to illustrate the welfare losses that arise as a result of non-cooperative behavior and the proposed solutions for moving closer to the socially optimal cooperative solutions. The proposed solutions are then examined in detail and the reviewer asks whether these solutions accurately describe the way he believes cooperation has occurred in the last two decades. Finally, this work is compared to recent research on policy cooperation that does not have game-theoretic foundations.
KeywordsMonetary Policy Theoretic Approach International Economic Public Finance Recent Book
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