Bargaining and the observability of contractual commitments via third parties

  • Günther Lang
Articles
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Abstract

This paper analyzes a two-stage model of bilateral bargaining where one of the agents has the option to delegate. A first approach is to assume that the contract between the agent and his representative is perfectly observable and can be renegotiated. Commitment effects arise although renegotiation is possible. Then, perfect observability of the contract is weakened to observe it with certain probability. Commitment effects as pure-strategy equilibria exist if this probability is sufficiently close to 1, in contrast to Bagwell's [1995] findings that imperfect observability undermines commitment. Considering the realistic case of the actual agreement between two parties being private information, the commitment value as equilibrium outcome disappears since having closed a renegotiation-proof contract offers costless self-insurance against strategic misunderstandings.

Keywords

Economic Growth International Economic Private Information Realistic Case Equilibrium Outcome 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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Copyright information

© International Atlantic Economic Society 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Günther Lang
    • 1
  1. 1.Nova University at LisbonPortugal

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