It is shown that Estes' formula for the asymptotic behavior of a subject under conditions of partial reinforcement can be derived from the assumption that the subject is behaving rationally in a certain game-theoretic sense and attempting to minimax his regret. This result illustrates the need for specifying the frame of reference or set of the subject when using the assumption of rationality to predict his behavior.
KeywordsPublic Policy Asymptotic Behavior Game Theory Statistical Theory Learning Theory
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