Philosophical Studies

, Volume 31, Issue 2, pp 133–140 | Cite as

Concrete occurrences vs. explanatory facts: Mackie on the extensionality of causal statements

  • Alexander Rosenberg


Causal Statement Concrete Occurrence 
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  1. 1.
    Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1974. All further page references in the text will be to this work.Google Scholar
  2. 3.
    Among recent writers on causation who have adopted this view are Hanson,Patterns of Discovery, Cambridge University Press, 1958; Scriven, ‘Causation as Explanation’Nous ix (1975), 1–16; and Beadsley, ‘Actions and Events: the Problem of Individuation’,American Philosophical Quarterly 12 (1975). Scriven writes: “a cause is an explanatory factor (of a particular kind). Causation is the relation between explanatory factors (of this kind) and what they explain” (p. 11). I suspect that Scriven is committed to the absence of causal relations in the absence of explanations demanded and offered.Google Scholar
  3. 4.
    Davidson, ‘Causal Relations’,Journal of Philosophy,lxxiv (1967), 691–703.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© D. Reidel Publishing Company 1977

Authors and Affiliations

  • Alexander Rosenberg
    • 1
  1. 1.Syracuse UniversityItaly

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