International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 15, Issue 2, pp 109–119 | Cite as

Allocating joint costs by means of the nucleolus

  • P. Legros
Papers

Abstract

This paper presents a sufficient condition for the nucleolus to coincide with the SCRB method vector and for nonemptiness of the core. It also studies the reasonableness and the monotonicity of the nucleolus under this condition. Finally it analyses the class of games satisfying the condition and compares it with the classes of convex games, subconvex games and the classQ of Driessen and Tijs.

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Copyright information

© Physica-Verlag 1986

Authors and Affiliations

  • P. Legros
    • 1
  1. 1.University of Paris XIIFrance

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