A relation between perfect equilibria in extensive form games and proper equilibria in normal form games
The concept of quasi-perfect equilibria for games in extensive form is introduced. It is shown that a proper equilibrium of a normal form game induces a quasi-perfect equilibrium in every extensive form game having this normal form.
KeywordsNormal Form Economic Theory Game Theory Extensive Form Form Game
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