Strategically zero-sum games: The class of games whose completely mixed equilibria cannot be improved upon
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In this paper we propose a new class of games, the “strategically zero-sum games,” which are characterized by a special payoff structure. We show that for a large body of correlation schemes which includes the correlated strategies “à la Aumann”, strategically zero-sum games are exactly these games for which no completely mixed Nash equilibrium can be improved upon.
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