The variations ensuing in a weighted majority game are studied when a player increases his weight in prejudice of others or decreases in favor, or trades shares outside the game (in particular when an-person game becomes an (n+1)-person one). An invariant behaviour for different game values is found for all these cases. Possible applications to politics, shareholdings and large games are pointed out.
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Sponsored by the GNAFA of the Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche.
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Gambarelli, G. Common behaviour of power indices. Int J Game Theory 12, 237–244 (1983). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01769093
- Economic Theory
- Game Theory
- Power Index
- Weighted Majority
- Common Behaviour