On equilibria in finite games
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We are concerned with Nash equilibrium points forn-person games. It is proved that, given any real algebraic numberα, there exists a 3-person game with rational data which has a unique equilibrium point andα is the equilibrium payoff for some player. We also present a method which allows us to reduce an arbitraryn-person game to a 3-person one, so that a number of questions about generaln-person games can be reduced to consideration of the special 3-person case. Finally, a completely mixed game, where the equilibrium set is a manifold of dimension one, is constructed.
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