International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 4, Issue 1, pp 25–55 | Cite as

Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games

  • R. Selten


Equilibrium Point Economic Theory Game Theory Extensive Game Perfectness Concept 
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Copyright information

© PHYSICA-VERLAG Rudolf Liebing KG 1975

Authors and Affiliations

  • R. Selten
    • 1
  1. 1.Institute of Mathematical EconomicsUniversity of BielefeldRhedaGermany

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