International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 8, Issue 1, pp 55–61 | Cite as

The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences

  • K. Nakamura


We consider a core of a simple game with ordinal preferences on a set of alternative outcomes Ω. When a player's strict preference relation takes any logically possible form of acyclic binary relation on Ω, necessary conditions for a simple game to have a nonempty core are given. If Ω is a finite set, the conditions are also sufficient. Further some related results are obtained.


Economic Theory Game Theory Preference Relation Binary Relation Related Result 
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Copyright information

© Physica-Verlag 1979

Authors and Affiliations

  • K. Nakamura
    • 1
  1. 1.Dept. of Humanities and Social SciencesTokyo Institute of TechnologyTokyoJapan

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