The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
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We consider a core of a simple game with ordinal preferences on a set of alternative outcomes Ω. When a player's strict preference relation takes any logically possible form of acyclic binary relation on Ω, necessary conditions for a simple game to have a nonempty core are given. If Ω is a finite set, the conditions are also sufficient. Further some related results are obtained.
KeywordsEconomic Theory Game Theory Preference Relation Binary Relation Related Result
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