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International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 19, Issue 2, pp 191–217 | Cite as

Nash equilibria of n-player repeated games with semi-standard information

  • E. Lehrer
Article

Abstract

The folk theorem is extended here to the case where after each stage of the repeated game each player is informed only about the equivalence classes of the pure actions which were used by the other players. The sets of upper equilibrium payoffs and of lower equilibrium payoffs are characterized here, and they are found to be different.

Keywords

Nash Equilibrium Equivalence Class Economic Theory Game Theory Repeated Game 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Physica-Verlag 1990

Authors and Affiliations

  • E. Lehrer
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Managerial Economics and Decision SciencesJ. L. Kellogg Graduate School of ManagementUSA
  2. 2.Department of MathematicsNorthwestern UniversityEvanston

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