International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 16, Issue 3, pp 161–186 | Cite as

Equal or proportional division of a surplus, and other methods

  • H. Moulin
Article

Abstract

A cooperative venture yields a nonnegative surplus. Agents are differentiated by their opportunity costs only. Two surplus sharing methods (equal sharing, proportional sharing) are characterized with the help of four axioms. Separability and No Advantageous Reallocation deal with coalitional changes in the opportunity costs. Additivity and Path Independence take into account variations in the surplus level.Any triple of these axioms characterizes equalor proportional sharing. Any pair of axioms characterize a distinct, infinite family of methods, compromising between equal and proportional sharing.

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Copyright information

© Physica-Verlag 1987

Authors and Affiliations

  • H. Moulin
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsVirginia Polytechnic Institute and State UniversityBlacksburg

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