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Informational structure for differential games

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Abstract

A positional approach for the definition of information structure in differential games is considered. A generalization ofKuhn's theorem [1953] concerning pure strategy equivalence for finite positional games is proved.

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References

  1. Coddington, E.A., andN. Levinson: Theory of Ordinary Differential Equations. New York 1955.

  2. Kuhn, H.W.: Extensive Games and the Problem of Information, Contributions to the Theory of Games, vol. II. Annuals of Math. Studies, No. 28. Princeton 1953, 193–216.

  3. Philippov, A.F.: Differenzialnye Uravneniya s razryvnoy pravoy chastyu, Mathematichesky sbornyk51 (93): I, M., 1960, 99–127.

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Kljushin, J.G. Informational structure for differential games. Int J Game Theory 12, 29–35 (1983). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01756102

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Keywords

  • Economic Theory
  • Game Theory
  • Information Structure
  • Pure Strategy
  • Differential Game