International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 10, Issue 3–4, pp 163–193 | Cite as

The super-additive solution for the Nash bargaining game

  • M. A. Perles
  • M. Maschler


The feasible set in a Nash bargaining game is a set in the utility space of the players. As such, its points often represent expectations on uncertain events. If this is the case, the feasible set changes in time as uncertainties resolve. Thus, if time for reaching agreement is not fixed in advance, one has to take into account options for delaying an agreement. This paper studies such games and develops a solution concept which has the property that its followers will always prefer to reach an immediate agreement, rather than wait until a new feasible set arises.


Economic Theory Game Theory Solution Concept Bargaining Game Utility Space 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Physica-Verlag 1981

Authors and Affiliations

  • M. A. Perles
    • 1
  • M. Maschler
    • 1
  1. 1.Institute of MathematicsThe Hebrew UniversityJerusalemIsrael

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