International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 10, Issue 3–4, pp 155–162 | Cite as

Value on a class of non-differentiable market games

  • Y. Tauman


We prove the existence of a (unique) Aumann-Shapley value on the space on non-atomic gamesQn generated byn-handed glove games. (These are the minima ofn non-atomic mutually singular probability measures.) It is also shown that this value can be extended to a value on the smallest space containingQn andpNA.


Probability Measure Economic Theory Game Theory Small Space Market Game 
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Copyright information

© Physica-Verlag 1981

Authors and Affiliations

  • Y. Tauman
    • 1
  1. 1.Graduate School of ManagementNorthwestern UniversityEvanstonUSA

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